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China's Use of Cyber Warfare: 
Espionage Meets Strategic 
Deterrence
Magnus Hjortdal
CHINA-SEC, Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen
magnushjortdal@hotmail.com
Abstract
This article presents three reasons for states to use cyber warfare and 
shows that cyberspace is—and will continue to be—a decisive element in 
China's strategy to ascend in the international system. The three reasons 
are: deterrence through infiltration of critical infrastructure; military-
technological espionage to gain military knowledge; and industrial espio-
nage to gain economic advantage. China has a greater interest in using 
cyberspace offensively than other actors, such as the United States, since 
it has more to gain from spying on and deterring the United States than 
the other way around. The article also documents China's progress in 
cyber warfare and shows how it works as an extension of its traditional 
strategic thinking and the current debate within the country. Several 
examples of cyber attacks traceable to China are also presented. This 
includes cyber intrusions on a nuclear arms laboratory, attacks on defense 
ministries (including the Joint Strike Fighter and an airbase) and the U.S. 
electric grid, as well as the current Google affair, which has proved to be a 
small part of a broader attack that also targeted the U.S. Government. 
There are, however, certain constraints that qualify the image of China as 
an aggressive actor in cyberspace. Some believe that China itself is the vic-
tim of just as many attacks from other states. Furthermore, certain actors 
in the United States and the West have an interest in overestimating 
China's capabilities in cyberspace in order to maintain their budgets.
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Introduction
"In today's information age, the People's Republic of China has replaced 
and even improved upon KGB methods of industrial espionage to the 
point that the People's Republic of China now presents one of the most 
capable threats to U.S. technology leadership and by extension its 
national security."1
—Dan Verton, Cyber Warfare Expert
Recently, China has been labeled a hacker state by mainstream media; 
therefore, the purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate by pro-
viding information about China's true capabilities in cyberspace. The arti-
cle further aims to explain and explore why China maintains and utilizes 
an aggressive cyber warfare posture; namely, cyberspace is an important 
dimension in present Chinese foreign and security politics. Examples are 
then provided that seek to explain why the United States feels threatened.
China's capabilities in cyberspace are analyzed through a strategic lens, 
and it is argued that the development of China's cyberspace capability can 
ensure its ascent to a future superpower status. The article concludes that 
China is most likely behind many of the attacks presented in mainstream 
media. Furthermore, China deliberately uses its cyber warfare capabilities 
to deter the United States. This strategy may ensure eventual strategic 
parity with the United States in technological and military prowess.
Cyber Warfare
Cyberspace is essential in modern warfare at the operational level, where 
soldiers are increasingly dependent on cyberspace; and at the strategic 
level, where a state's weaknesses and strengths in cyberspace can be used 
to deter and affect the strategic balance of power.
What is cyber warfare? The highly regarded London-based International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) generally considers cyber warfare 
as an intellectually underdeveloped field very similar to the lack of 
research on the dynamics of nuclear weapons in the 1950s. IISS 
Director-General and Chief Executive John Chipman recently said that 
"future state-on-state conflict may be characterized by the use of so-
called asymmetric techniques. Chief among these may be the use of 
cyber-warfare."2
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The dynamics of the cyberspace realm mean that it is easier to attack than 
to defend.3 According to the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, "the 
speed of cyber attacks and the anonymity of cyberspace greatly favors the 
offence. This advantage is growing as hacker tools become cheaper and 
easier to employ by adversaries whose skills are growing in 
sophistication."4
There are three reasons for states to maintain and utilize an aggressive 
cyber capability:5
1. to deter other states by infiltrating their critical infrastructure;6
2. to gain increased knowledge through espionage in cyberspace, which 
makes it possible for states to advance more quickly in their military 
development;7
3. to make economic gains where technological progress has been 
achieved—for example, through industrial espionage.8 This can be car-
ried out outside official institutions.
States may also need advanced cyber warfare capabilities for a further 
reason—namely, in order to be able to attack and paralyze an adversary's 
military capacity or the adversary's ability to control its own forces.9 As 
this fourth reason will only become apparent during times of conflict and 
actual warfare, it will not be considered further in this article, since there 
are no examples of it regarding present relations between China and the 
United States.
An analysis of Chinese state capabilities in cyberspace is an extremely rel-
evant object of study since China gains greater advantage from possessing 
offensive capabilities in cyberspace than most other state actors. It must 
be emphasized, however, that the purpose of this article is not to present 
China as the only bad kid on the block that is breaking the rules of good 
behavior.
The West and the United States, for example, may also be expected to act 
similarly to what China is accused of doing.10 However, an analysis of 
American capabilities is not the topic here since the United States does 
not have as much to gain relative to China by developing an aggressive 
cyber capability. This can be seen in light of the three reasons previously 
cited for which states seek to maintain and utilize such a capability. First, 
the United States does not need to deter other states via cyberspace, since 
it manages just fine militarily. Secondly, the reality today is that since U.S. 
military technology is second to none, intensive espionage to gain knowl-
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edge about other states' military technology is not necessary. As for the 
third reason regarding economic advantage, industrial espionage has less 
significance for the United States since industrial-technological levels in 
the United States are among the most advanced in the world.
China, on the other hand, with regard to the first reason, has an interest in 
avoiding exposure to political and military pressure from the West and 
the United States. Secondly, China also has an interest in accelerating its 
military development since it is still far behind the West in general. And 
finally, with regard to the third reason, China's general technological level 
is also behind that of the United States, which gives it an increased incen-
tive for industrial espionage in order to achieve economic advantage.
It is thus especially pertinent to examine China's capability in cyberspace, 
but we must nonetheless remember that other state actors use the same 
techniques. The difference is that the incentives to use cyberspace offen-
sively are fewer for the West and the United States by comparison.
Cyber capabilities are not a subject that states discuss openly, since it is 
rarely beneficial for a state to publicize that it is spying on another state or 
that it is causing another state's networks to close down. Much is written 
about the vital importance of possessing a cyber capability,11 and while 
states do not directly announce their own offensive capabilities in cyber-
space, this does not prevent them from discussing and analyzing other 
states' capabilities and options in this area.12 The uncertainty about the 
actual sophistication of China's capabilities can deter the United States 
and other states further, since, according to classical military logic, states 
must be prepared for the worst when they do not know the actual strength 
of their potential rivals.
By acting aggressively, states can increase the risk of accusations that they 
are carrying out cyber attacks, which paradoxically can benefit a country 
like China. This is because the deterrent aspect of possessing advanced 
cyber capabilities might not otherwise be detected or widely known. In 
other words, if North Korea were the only state in the world that knew it 
had nuclear arms and the rest of the world was convinced that this was 
not the case, then the deterrent element of North Korea's nuclear weap-
ons program would not exist. The strategy of deterrence is thus two-sided 
and, as such, contradictory—a balancing act is needed between hiding the 
maximum level of capability on the one hand, and communicating and 
proving that the capability exists on a sufficiently high level to deter other 
states on the other.
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China's Thinking and Capabilities in Cyberspace
China's military strategy mentions cyber capabilities as an area that the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) should invest in and use on a large 
scale.13 The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has also declared 
that China's development in the cyber area increasingly concerns him,14 
and that there has been a decade-long trend of cyber attacks emanating 
from China.15
Virtually all digital and electronic military systems can be attacked via 
cyberspace. Therefore, it is essential for a state to develop capabilities in 
this area if it wishes to challenge the present American hegemony. The 
interesting question then is whether China is developing capabilities in 
cyberspace in order to deter the United States.16
China's military strategists describe cyber capabilities as a powerful 
asymmetric opportunity in a deterrence strategy.19 Analysts consider that 
an "important theme in Chinese writings on computer-network opera-
tions (CNO) is the use of computer-network attack (CNA) as the spear-
point of deterrence."20 CNA increases the enemy's costs to become too 
great to engage in warfare in the first place, which Chinese analysts judge 
Box 1: Concepts of cyber warfare
The general NATO term is Computer Network Operations (CNO).
Under CNO three elements can be identified:17
1. Computer-Network Exploitation (CNE), which covers attempts to 
gather information about a system to use for later attacks
2. Computer-Network Attack (CNA), which covers attempts to attack 
systems
3. Computer-Network Defense (CND), which refers to one's own 
defense against an attack
The connection among the three is that effective CNA cannot be carried 
out without also having CNE and CND and vice versa.
In China, CNO and outer space capabilities are covered by the same 
term, informationization, whereas CNO covers the cyberspace part of 
the Chinese term.18 
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to be essential for deterrence.21 This could, for example, leave China with 
the potential ability to deter the United States from intervening in a sce-
nario concerning Taiwan. CNO is viewed as a focal point for the People's 
Liberation Army, but it is not clear how the actual capacity functions or 
precisely what conditions it works under.22
If a state with superpower potential (here China) is to create an opportu-
nity to ascend militarily and politically in the international system, it 
would require an asymmetric deterrence capability such as that described 
here.23
It is said that the "most significant computer network attack is character-
ized as a pre-emption weapon to be used under the rubric of the rising 
Chinese strategy of […] gaining mastery before the enemy has struck."24 
Therefore, China, like other states seeking a similar capacity, has 
recruited massively within the hacker milieu inside China.25 Increasing 
resources in the PLA are being allocated to develop assets in relation to 
cyberspace.26 The improvements are visible: The PLA has established 
"information warfare" capabilities,27 with a special focus on cyber war-
fare that, according to their doctrine, can be used in peacetime.28 Strate-
gists from the PLA advocate the use of virus and hacker attacks that can 
paralyze and surprise its enemies.29
Aggressive and Widespread Cyber Attacks from 
China and the International Response
China's use of asymmetric capabilities, especially cyber warfare, could 
pose a serious threat to the American economy.30 Research and develop-
ment in cyber espionage figure prominently in the 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011–2015) that is being drafted by both the Chinese central government 
and the PLA.31
Analysts say that China could well have the most extensive and aggressive 
cyber warfare capability in the world, and that this is being driven by 
China's desire for "global-power status."32 These observations do not 
come out of the blue, but are a consequence of the fact that authoritative 
Chinese writings on the subject present cyber warfare as an obvious 
asymmetric instrument for balancing overwhelming (mainly U.S.) power, 
especially in case of open conflict, but also as a deterrent.33
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In general, China is very active on the cyber scene.34 A high Chinese level 
of capability is indicated when, for example, it has allegedly infiltrated 
computers in 103 countries in order to keep an eye on exiled Tibetans' 
struggle for a free Tibet.35
While American security experts call the U.S. defense against cyber 
attacks "embarrassing" and state that it "has effectively run out of 
steam,"38 China is allocating many resources to its cyber program.39 
Nonetheless, the director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
has stated that cyber attacks can be compared to the attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, and that "[w]e take threats to the cyber world as seriously as 
we take threats from the material world."40 Indeed, a 2007 cyber attack 
on an American nuclear arms laboratory confirms the need to take the 
threats from cyberspace very seriously. It is not known with any certainty 
how much data was downloaded,41 but the attack could be traced to 
China, and all the indications are that it was carried out by state organiza-
tions. At worst, it might have resulted in the transfer of American nuclear 
weapons technology.
In the United Kingdom (UK), a 14-page document from MI5 called "The 
Threat from Chinese Espionage," drawn up in 2008, has now made it into 
public spheres. The restricted report said that "[a]ny UK company might 
be at risk if it holds information which would benefit the Chinese."42 Fur-
thermore, the report describes how China's cyber warfare campaign had 
Box 2: Statements about China's cyber capabilities
"Critical U.S. infrastructure is vulnerable to malicious cyber activity. 
Chinese military doctrine calls for exploiting these vulnerabilities in 
the case of a conflict."
The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission 200936
"[The Chinese government] resolutely oppose[s] any crime, including 
hacking, that destroys the Internet or computer network […]; some 
people overseas with Cold War mentality are indulged in fabricating 
the sheer lies of the so-called cyberspies in China."
Wang Baodung, spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, 
April 200937
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targeted British defense, energy, communications and manufacturing 
companies, as well as public relations and international law firms, some 
of them being a vital part of the British critical infrastructure.43
In 2009, the British Joint Intelligence Committee, which coordinates 
work between the two intelligence services, MI5 and MI6, warned that 
China's cyber espionage is becoming very sophisticated and mature in its 
approach. It was described how this could enable China to shut down crit-
ical services, including power, food, and water supplies.44 This is not the 
first time that China has been accused of aggressive cyber operations by 
the British. The head of the UK's domestic intelligence service, MI5, 
stated in December 2007 that it was under (cyber) attack by "Chinese 
state organizations."45
China's offensive cyber capabilities are identified in numerous additional 
UK reports from analysts and defense ministries. They describe a Chinese 
military exercise as early as 2005 directly aimed at practicing hacking into 
enemy networks.46 The vice-chairman of the U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff, 
General James Cartwright, has said that a full-scale Chinese cyber attack 
potentially has the same effect as weapons of mass destruction.47 This has 
triggered a lively discussion on whether the same dynamics created by 
nuclear weapons can apply in a new context.48, 49 Furthermore, one west-
ern expert says, with clear reference to Chinese cyber warriors: "Let's say 
an emerging superpower would dedicate 20,000, 30,000, 40,000 people 
and then unleash that force at some point, I would say we would not be 
ready."50
The Deterrence Effect on the United States: 
Electricity Grids and an Airbase
Cyber capabilities have a real deterrent effect when a state shows its capa-
bilities to the world. This happened when the United States became aware 
that its electricity network had been hacked into in 2009 and that parts of 
the network allegedly could be shut down whenever the hacker wished to 
do so.51 Other sources, even though a little more skeptical about the scope 
of such intrusions, indicate that although these foreign intruders did not 
cause immediate damage, they left behind software programs that could 
be used in the future to disrupt this critical infrastructure.52 This attack 
was traced to China, and the chief of counterintelligence in the United 
States at the time stated that "[w]e have seen Chinese network operations 
inside certain of our electricity grids."53 The fact that Americans were not 
able to protect their electricity network is one critical aspect, but another 
is that this shows that the United States could have a serious problem in 
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meeting the challenge of an ambitious Chinese cyber program.54 U.S. 
security experts have previously expressed their concerns. After the April 
2007 cyber attacks on Estonia, following a surge of nationalism from Rus-
sia that caused a severe breakdown and paralyzed the heavily IT-based 
Estonian infrastructure, Pentagon cyber security expert Sami Saydjari 
told the U.S. Congress that "a similar mass cyber attack could leave the 
United States without power for six months—sufficient time to allow 
China to occupy Taiwan, or Russia to 'liberate' Georgia."55 Such state-
ments pinpoint the vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure. At present, 
the United States is also behind China with regard to the training of engi-
neers who can be used in cyber-related functions.56
In addition, an American airbase was forced to shut off its network and 
stop takeoffs and landings for a time, due to a massive virus attack traced 
to China.57 We can only guess about the exact state of security in other 
western countries, but the level is hardly much higher than in the United 
States. Recent developments indicate that the level in NATO and the EU 
is even more vulnerable to cyber attacks because each member state is 
required to have its own cyber defense.58
More Cyber Attacks: Joint Strike Fighter, Pentagon, 
and Merkel
In 2009, there was a forced electronic entry into the Joint Strike Fighter 
program and large amounts of data were copied.59 According to present 
and former employees at the Pentagon, the attack can be traced to 
China.60 This could mean that it would be easy for China to defend itself 
against the aircraft (which many western countries expect to acquire) and, 
assuming the attackers have acquired enough data, they may even be able 
to copy parts of it.61 The American chief of counterintelligence has been 
reported as saying that "our networks are being mapped" with reference 
to American flight traffic control, and also as having warned about a situ-
ation in which "a fighter pilot can't trust his radar."62
The Pentagon has already had a "computer security incident," apparently 
involving the malevolent use of Universal Serial Bus (USB) memory 
sticks, after which these sticks were banned.63 China is the world's largest 
producer of USB memory sticks,64 and certain observers speak informally 
about the possibilities a state would have if it could program all the USB 
memory sticks produced in the country so that information about the con-
tent of the computers using them could be sent back to a center at home. 
This is, of course, a paranoid thought experiment, but it clearly illustrates 
the fear and seriousness that cyber warfare and hacking inspire. On the 
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other hand, no reports suggest that the Pentagon's internal communica-
tions system has been hacked into, so at present it seems that no U.S. vital 
wartime communications have been compromised.
The office of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has also been hacked 
into and very sensitive data copied. The attack was later traced back to 
China.65 The fact that it was possible to break into Merkel's computer has 
great implications for the seriousness of China's capabilities in cyber-
space. To underline the German worries of Chinese cyber attacks, German 
counterintelligence agent Walter Opfermann has said that China is steal-
ing industrial secrets in great numbers and also is capable of "sabotaging 
whole chunks of infrastructure," such as the German power grid. He con-
cludes that "[t]his poses a danger not just for Germany but for critical 
infrastructure worldwide."66
Google Was Just a Little Part of a Larger Attack
In connection with a massive hacker attack against Google's email cus-
tomer accounts in December 2009,67 it has since become clear that the 
attacks (which caused Google to withdraw temporarily from its coopera-
tion on censorship) formed just a small part of a larger cyber attack 
against at least 34 American companies and institutions with links to the 
U.S. administration, including suppliers to the Pentagon and even some 
members of the U.S. Congress.68 The Google affair attracted great media 
attention to an area of great concern for the United States. Reports have 
linked two Chinese educational institutions to the attacks on Google: 
Lanxiang Vocational School based in Jinan, Shandong province; and 
Shanghai Jiaotong University.69 In a point of departure from cyber deter-
rence, the Google affair was likely a Chinese attempt to spy on what 
Beijing labels "separatists," and was likely not a part of any strategic 
deterrence strategy.70
Analysts from the U.S. Government, including experts from the National 
Security Agency (NSA), remain certain that a Chinese security consultant 
in his thirties made the program that was used to launch the attacks on 
Google and more than 30 other companies.71 According to the sources, 
"[t]he spyware creator is a freelancer and did not launch the attack, but 
Beijing officials had 'special access' to his programming."72 In a report 
identifying the origin of the attacks in December 2009, experts from Veri-
Sign Defence stated without reservation that the Chinese Government 
was behind them.73 At the same time, a classified FBI report was leaked, 
claiming that China had developed a "cyber army" comprising 30,000 
military cyber spies plus 150,000 spies hired from the private sector.74 
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The report states that their mission was to steal American military and 
technological secrets,75 something also described by the leading officer of 
the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Willard.76
The spokesperson from the Chinese Ministry of National Defense has said 
that, "[l]inking the cyber hacking with the Chinese Government and mili-
tary is baseless, highly irresponsible, and hype with ulterior motives."78 
Nevertheless, it might not be biased or irresponsible to suspect the Chi-
nese state, as most experts point to Beijing being behind the Google 
attacks.79 Dan Blum, a leading analyst from IT consultancy Burton 
Group, said the preponderance of evidence pointed to Chinese involve-
Box 3: Who is behind China's cyber warfare?77
Public part of cyber warfare
The public part of cyber warfare in China is directed by the PLA Gen-
eral Staff, 4th Department (Electronic Countermeasures and Radar). 
CND and CNE are delegated to the PLA General Staff, 3rd Department 
(Signals Intelligence and Technical), that roughly is equivalent to the 
U.S. National Security Agency. "Training in CNO occurs across all Peo-
ple's Liberation Army service branches, from command to company 
level, and is considered a core competence of all combat units. Field 
exercises include joint operations in 'complex electromagnetic environ-
ments,' and sources indicate the existence of a permanent 'informa-
tionized Blue Force' regiment, drilled in foreign Information Warfare 
tactics."
Military-civilian blurring
Examples of cooperation between private hackers and the PLA do 
occur. Hackers have even publicly referred to their incorporation into 
PLA operations in a 2005 message on the hacker community called the 
Honker Union of China. The message stated that the hackers have 
"government-approved network technology security units."
Further indication of the formal and informal cooperation between the 
military and civilian parts are seen in PLA's sponsorship of numerous 
universities and institutes supporting research and development in 
information warfare. "These include the Science and Engineering Uni-
versity in Hefei, the Information Engineering University in Zhengzhou, 
the National University of Defense Technology in Changsha, and the 
Communications Command Academy in Wuhan."
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ment. "Myself, and a lot of people, are well past 99% sure."80 Leading U.S. 
scholar Larry Wortzel is also quite certain that the Chinese Government 
was involved in the recent cyber attacks, as well as several in the past.81
One of the most recognized experts in this area, James A. Lewis, produced 
this concise analysis of the attacks: "This is a big espionage program 
aimed at getting high-tech information and politically sensitive informa-
tion—the high-tech information to jump-start China's economy and the 
political information to ensure the survival of the regime […]. This is what 
China's leadership is after. This reflects China's national priorities."82 
Besides that, Mike McConnell, who is former Director of the NSA and 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has recently said that "The 
United States is fighting a cyber-war today, and we're losing."83
Constraints
How capable and effective is Chinese cyber warfare capability?
1. Who actually attacks whom? China's own network appears to be 
unprotected, and other countries can launch attacks through China, 
which makes it appear the primary suspect.84 IT expert Steve Arm-
strong furthermore states that "[i]t's too easy to blame China […] In 
fact, legitimate countries are bouncing their attacks through China. It's 
very easy to do, so why not? […] My evil opinion is that some western 
governments are already doing this."85
2. Actors in the United States have an interest in exaggerating China's 
capabilities. In order to justify their existence and obtain increased 
budgets, several actors in the United States may have an interest in 
presenting China as a threat to U.S. security. The Pentagon, specific 
politicians, and the intelligence services are often accused of acting as 
they did during the Cold War, thus contributing to conflict-like rela-
tions between China and the United States.86
3. China proposes global cooperation against hacking.87 This might 
sound like a sound proposal, but as described throughout this article, 
certain states have much to gain by carrying out cyber attacks, which 
makes cooperation difficult. Besides, it is extremely hard to see how 
such cooperation could be enforced and by whom.
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4. It is also possible to imagine that in China, CNO has an anarchic lead-
ership structure, meaning that the central leadership cannot control 
who carries out attacks. Some American reports indicate this very 
fact.88 Critical voices say, however, that this is just due to the way the 
Chinese use hackers from outside the military and the government to 
carry out attacks.89
5. China denies having any military hackers in the country.90 Other 
countries would most likely deny the same, but to what extent soldiers 
in the PLA with high-level IT knowledge are being used to carry out 
cyber attacks is another question. Based on the references cited in this 
article, it is likely that the PLA uses hackers for espionage.
6. Some think that focusing on China's capabilities does not deal with the 
fact that Beijing itself is very dependent on cyberspace for military and 
civilian purposes. This means that at the same time as China is devel-
oping cyber warfare techniques, its own vulnerability is often over-
looked.91 I would argue that China can still deter the U.S., even though 
the U.S. is more powerful in all spheres. This is due to the dynamics of 
the asymmetrical techniques that China pursues, e.g., in cyberspace, 
which are changing the dynamics of the balance of power that we knew 
during the Cold War.
In spite of the constraints above, an understanding of the importance of 
cyber warfare is found in the PLA's strategic thinking.92 This form of 
asymmetric strategy has been debated internally for a long time,93 and a 
book that attracted much attention, Unrestricted Warfare, written by two 
Chinese colonels, states that "[i]n the information age, the influence 
exerted by a nuclear bomb is perhaps less than the influence exerted by a 
hacker."94
Conclusion
The evidence in this article has contextualized the elements of cyber war-
fare capabilities. On the basis of three reasons put forward for states to 
maintain and utilize the cyber domain aggressively, an analysis was made 
of China's cyber warfare capabilities. The analysis has shown that China is 
likely to have conducted several cyber attacks in the past and present, and 
probably will continue with that strategy in the future, as this is of great 
importance for its economy, military, and deterrence of the United States.
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Implications: China as Cyberpower and Superpower
In the foreword to the Australian Defense White Paper entitled Defending 
Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, on the country's future 
defense policy, the Australian defense minister, Joel Fitzgibbon, writes:
"[C]yber warfare has emerged as a serious threat to critical infra-
structure [and] the biggest changes to our outlook over the period 
have been the rise of China […] [T]he beginning of the end of the 
so-called unipolar moment; the almost two-decade-long period in 
which the pre-eminence of our principal ally, the United States, 
was without question."95
The unipolar moment during which the United States could ensure all its 
allies' security is undergoing change, and China's capabilities for cyber 
warfare are an important element in this change.
In order to meet this challenge, the United States has now launched a new 
"Cyber Command" and appointed a "Cyber Czar" to coordinate national 
preparedness.96 It should also not be forgotten that the United States is 
doing a lot on both defensive and offensive cyber network operations.97 In 
the dynamics of CNO, where it is far more difficult to defend than to 
attack,98 it will be extremely difficult for the United States to counter 
China's capabilities in this area. America will continue to give its cyber 
capabilities a high priority, but the cumulative deterrence effect may not 
be known until the future, if at all.99 But along with such efforts, the Chi-
nese will also try to avoid a situation in which their deterrent capabilities 
become neutralized.
In sum, ascending states have much to gain from an offensive and aggres-
sive cyber capability, primarily because of the fact that it is difficult to 
prove directly who is behind such attacks. Thus, there is a high probability 
that the Chinese build-up in the cyber area will continue. China's cyber 
deterrence capability in the longer term will make it possible for further 
Chinese expansion in the political-military area so that one day, China 
may become a de jure superpower across economic, technological, and 
military domains.
Frankly, the Chinese cyber deterrence is a strategically intelligent solution 
that is quite cheap, compared to a full-scale conventional military, and it 
is capable of effectively deterring the United States from a large-scale con-
ventional military engagement.
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